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ucationa] problems. It was my aim, in the just-mentioned chapter 
and ~elsewhere, to make explicit certain aspects of Bode's phi- 
losophy as the standpoint from which he discussed educational 
problems*. 'In the sense that I made explicit something which was 
implicit in most of Bode's educational writings, therefore, I have 
done something that Bode did not do. 
Although Bode was gifted in his ability to put his notions 
in "common-sense terms," the fact remains that he was not 
writing for the common man in his philosophical essays. Surely, 
in part at least, it is the work of a philosopher, as philosopher, 
to try to gain insights into ideas that may give direction to the 
life men share in common. In doing so, a technical language is 
developed, an "uncommon" language. And, like other philoso- 
phers, Bode sometimes wrote in uncommon terms. 
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With the publication of Handbook II: Affective Domain, 
the Taxonomy of Educational Objectives nears completion. Only 
one volume of the projected three volume series now remains 
undone. When it is finished, if everything goes as planned, we 
will have at our disposal three systematic schemes for rationally 
classifying those propositions in educational discourse which 
function as objectives for student behavior. Respectively labeled 
'~Cognitive," "Affective," and "Psychomotor," each of these schemes 
or domains, then, will have appeared as a separate publication 
in this broad classification venture. Although presently incom- 
plete, the project already shows promise of becoming the most 
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comprehensive and detailed study of categories for ordering ed- 
ucational goals yet made available to the professional educator. 
If this promise is fully realized, the Taxonomy should be of 
considerable aid in selecting, organizing, or evaluating almost 
any set of instructional activities. 
Needless to say, such a project is worthy of every educa- 
tor's attention. As the authors themselves point out, all too fre- 
quently our descriptions of the behavior we want our students 
to achieve are stated as nothing but meaningless platitudes and 
empty cliches. (p. 4) If our educational objectives, they continue, 
are actually to give direction to the activities of both students 
and teachers, we must "tighten" our language by making the 
terminology with which we express our aims more clear and 
meaningful. Certainly, to the extent that the Taxonomy con- 
tributes to the achievement of such an outcome, it possesses 
much that is of worth. Any criticisms I may have of the Affective 
Domain, then, are to be looked upon as my attempt to join with 




O n t o l o g y  w i t h o u t  l o g i c  
Following the format established with the Cognitive Domain, 
the Affective Domain is divided into two major sections or parts. 
The first is largely devoted to describing the nature of the affec- 
tire taxonomy, explaining its development, and examining various 
assumptions upon which it rests. The second is composed of the 
classification scheme itself, together with numerous sets of illus- 
trative objectives and test items. This classification scheme, or 
taxonomy, is made up of five hierarchically arranged categories 
which provide individual descriptions of different changes that 
occur in behavior as values or attitudes are learned. Each of 
these categories, then, is partitioned into several subdivisions 
that contain groups of sample test items and educational objec- 
tives. In all, the five categories furnish a total of thirteen separate 
subdivisions. 
In contrast with the first handbook, this one devotes con- 
siderably more space to the business of introducing and explain- 
ing its system of classification. No doubt, this is partially due to 
the fact that the authors found it necessary to carefully relate it 
to the former taxonomy as well as clearly describe-some of the 
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unique problems involved in investigating its often ignored sub- 
ject matter. However, one gets the further impression that it is 
also due to a desire on the part of these writers to respond to 
various criticisms that may have been brought against the earlier 
volume and, unless countered now, may well be raised again to 
plague this one. 
The opening sections of the fourth chapter contain one of 
these apparent responses. I call attention to it because it func- 
tions as an important part of the rationale currently used by the 
authors to support their entire triparted taxonomic project. Here, 
they point out that when distinguishing between affective and 
cognitive objectives, they are not to be interpreted as suggesting 
that there exists a parallel distinction built into the basic fabric 
of behavior. ((p. 45) They assert that the Taxonomy is purely 
an analytic abstraction. Its division into three domains, cognitive, 
affective, and psychomotor, is an arbitrary arrangement that 
seems to best reflect the way in which educators have tradition- 
ally classified teaching objectives. (p. 47) It does not reflect 
intrinsic separations within behavior. 
If there are any who would wish to take serious issue with 
the adequacy of this stance, I am certainly not one of them. I 
find it to be quite acceptable. What I do have difficulty with, 
however, is the fact that the au thors -  without apparent concern 
- w e a v e  a contradictory theme into their position as they go 
about fashioning it. After emphasizing that behavior cannot be 
dissected into cognitive and affective segments, they immediately 
turn about and assert that, in order to properly study it, they 
must "tease" it apart into cognitive and affective components. 
(pp. 45-46) When they tell us that there is a fundamental cogni- 
tive-affective unity to behavior, they follow by contending that 
cognitive behavior is involved in affective behavior. This contra- 
diction is affirmed time and again as the terms 'cognitive behavior' 
and "affective behavior' are repeatedly employed in describing 
human conduct. Its presence strongly indicates that on ontological 
characterization of behavior has been substituted for a taxonomic 
description of educational objectives. A domain composed of a 
certain kind of goal statements has been converted into a domain 
composed of an alleged species of behavior. Certainly, any study 
said to be rooted in a scientific behaviorism has no room in it 
for any such category mistakes. The propositions used to describe 
various separations among certain objectives, or goal statements, 
cannot be automatically applied to the subject matter of those 
objectives without bringing about a serious methodological error. 
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I I  
T h e  
' ' o f f i c i a l  d o c t r i n e ' '  
a g a i n  
In order to establish a true taxonomy, descriptions of vari- 
ous categories or classes must be ordered and related to one 167 
another in some systematic manner. Otherwise, the descriptions 
will follow in an accidental or random fashion precluding any 
but chance possibility that they will ever form an identifiable 
scheme. As a means of providing such unity to the various affee- 
tive objectives they were considering for inclusion in their taxon- 
omy, the Affective Domain authors elected to employ the concept 
of "internalization" as their central regulative device. Objectives 
then could be systematically organized along a hierarchiel con- 
tinuum according to the degree that a learner could be said to 
have internalized attitudes, values, or affective responses. For 
theses writers, this concept appeared suitable not only because 
it permitted the construction of a "meaningful continuum," but  
also because it was compatible with certain theories of how 
affeetive learning takes place and it was consistent with the 
behavioral point of view. (p. 28) Thus, they probably felt that 
as long as they confined the content of their affeetive categories 
to descriptions of behavioral phenomena their affective taxonomy 
would rest on a reasonably secure methodological foundation. 
Upon close inspection, however, this does seem to be the case. 
By using the notion of "internalization" as their principal 
classification tool, the authors seem to have infused the Affective 
Domain with a mind-body dualism. Unless 'internalization' is 
given a non-inventive stipulative definition, it is generally taken 
to be a word that is used in referring to a process whereby some- 
thing, in one way or another, is transferred from an external 
state or location to one that is internal. Thus, an internal-external 
or inner-outer division of something is clearly implicated. In fact, 
it cannot be logically avoided. 
Such an implication is present in the Affective Domain. 
Although its authors have attempted to give the term 'internaliza- 
tion' a non-inventive stipulative definition by linking it with such 
expressions as 'socialization' and 'adopted behavior,' they also 
have characterized its use by repeatedly falling back upon theo- 
ries, phrases, and words that implicate or suggest an internal- 
external dichotomy. We find them speaking of "inner growth," 
S t u d i e s  in P h i l o s o p h y  a n d  E d u c a t i o n  
168 
"inner control," "outward behavior," "inner compulsion," and 
"external-to-internal control transition." 
Of course, the use of these terms and phrases, alone, does 
not implicate a concept of man that necessarily represents a 
Cartesian dualism. It might be the case, for example, that the 
authors have employed such expressions merely to indicate the 
location of various stimuli sources relative to the outer surface 
or epidermis of an organism. Thus, the behavior described by 
an affective objective could be oonsidered internalized if the 
stimuli source leading to its occurrence were located inside of 
an organism rather than outside of it. 
Initially, this appears to be exactly what the authors are 
saying. In speaking of internalization as growth, they assert that 
external or environmental control progressively yields to internal 
control so that, in the case of acquiring affective responses, there 
is a gradual decrease of the former and increase of the latter. 
(p. 80) External control is successively replaced by internal con- 
trol. However, when we attempt to find out explicitly what con- 
stitutes these controls, the entire matter begins to take on a 
distinctly different form. Although there is considerable discus- 
sion of individuals responding to stimuli, that which is described 
as being internalized and is said to control behavior is not con- 
sidered to be a stimulus source. Instead, it appears to be a 
value or set of values. Values, the authors say, are successively 
internalized by the learner. (p. 85) As the internalization process 
unfolds, these values are absorbed more and more into an indi- 
vidual's internal controlling structure. (pp. 27-28) At the outset 
of the process, they merely capture the student's attention while 
at the end they are accepted into his interrelated view of the 
world. (p. 83) 
From this it is diiticult not to get the impression that the 
authors are saying that the process of internalization begins when 
a given value is selected from someplace exterior to the surface 
of the organism and then is gradually brought into its interior. 
Their heavy reliance upon psychoanalytic theory, as an aid in 
explaining their position, further supports this. They assert that 
the major aspect of internalization is the process of incorporating 
something within one's mind or body. (p. 29) To internalize 
values, they indicate, is to incorporate, as one's own various 
moral standards. (p. 89) 
Clearly, at this point, these writers cannot be talking about 
the origins of stimuli. That is, they cannot be treating values 
as either external or internal stimuli sources. External stimuli 
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sources-  unless, of course, they are objects such as food or knives 
actually being injected into organisms-  cannot be incorporated 
into individuals. They may give rise to various responses on the 
part of the individual but, certainly, they are not incorporated 
into him. Internal stimuli sources, on the other hand, are sources 
of stimuli located within organisms. They are internal by defini- 
tion. What sense, then, would it make to speak of them as being 
incorporated within an organism? They are already inside it. 
Consequently, it appears that the authors of the Affective Do- 
main, no matter what they assert to the contrary, do not con- 
sistently subscribe to an operational behaviorism. Their occasional 
reliance upon a mentalistic use of the terms "willing," "con- 
sciousness," "superego," and "conscience," lends further credence 
to this conclusion. Their brand of behaviorism, therefore, takes 
on the appearance of a mask. It seems to be applied as though 
those who fashioned it were not yet quite convineed that modi- 
fications of behavior could be adequately explained without 
postulating the existence of a mind allegedly located someplace 
in the body. 
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I l i  
I s  a . . t a x o n o m y  
w i t h o u t  m e t a p h y s i c s  
p o s s i b l e ?  
Lack of space prohibits any further probing at this time. 
Before concluding, however, I would like to make one final 
observation. Thus far, my comments have been directed at only 
the first part of the Cognitive Domain. The second part, which 
is largely confined to the presentment of the taxonomy proper, 
has been almost totally ignored. The reason for this is that I 
think it has been rather well done and there is little to be said 
about it in the absence of a broad empirical investigation into 
its general usefulness. Nevertheless, I do have one problem with 
it. I have considerable diffieulty in locating any extensive con- 
nection between it and the rationale used in the first half of the 
book to support it. In this respect, the two sections appear to be 
logically independent. The metaphysical overtones pervading 
much of the first section, are completely lacking in the second. 
All implied reference to a class of affeetive behaviors has disap- 
peared and any implication that values are allegedly incorporated 
into either a mind or an organism is totally absent. A behavior- 
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istic language has been substituted for the earlier dualistic one 
while the notion of conditioning has apparently replaced the 
concept of internalization. Thus, I feel as though I must end 
with a question. Why did the authors of the Affective Domain 
find it necessary to construct a metaphysical support for their 
venture when it can stand very well without such a crutch? 
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You are beginning to read an arbitrary and personal selec- 
tion and review of last year's periodical literature in which there 
was reference to philosophy and education. 
Last y e a r -  P. E. of ' 6 4 -  was nicely summed by Arthur H. 
Moehlman in the January, 1965 Newsletter of the Department of 
History and Philosophy of Education, The University of Texas. 
Professor Moehlman's summation was not intended as such. He 
was pointing the future for the spirited young and the "young 
in spirit." He signalled, "diversity in philosophy of education," 
which, "helps to guarantee a perpetual renaissance, or new take- 
off phases for philosophy directly involved in the field of vital 
common human experience and oriented toward humankind's 
vast future." 
In the pot-ponrri of non-rhyming poesies to follow, I shall 
carefully dissect bits of blank verse masquerading as philosophy 
in or and or of or for or beyond education. In wielding my knife 
of abstracting, I shall lift o u t -  when this action seems possible-  
those bits which seem to be the raison d'dtre of the whole. In 
my cutting, quotations will be taken out of context and the 
organic wholeness of the pieces reviewed might be seriously 
impaired. It is quite possible that with such maltreatment an 
organism might die. If such ~hould happen: corpus requiescat 
malls, 
